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WHEN THE JUDGE IS NOT THE PRIMARY OFFICIAL WITH
RESPONSIBILITY TO READ: AGENCY
INTERPRETATION AND THE PROBLEM
OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
PETER L. STRAUSS*

As the other pages of this journal reflect, writing about statutory
interpretation commonly builds on unarticulated assumptions about the
occasion for interpretation, the identity of the interpreter, and the character of the interpreted text. In this paradigm, the occasion for interpretation is a litigated case-an episode has occurred for which the
application of the statute is problematic. The interpreter is a judge, a
person who resolves litigation-typically episodic, typically backwardsworking outside of politics, and bearing no generic responsibility (that is,
responsibility outside the decision of the case before her) for the statutory
regime. And the interpreted text is imagined to have the characteristic of
resolving the problem at hand-to interpret is to find the meaning in the
statute that itself answers the question presented.
For a large and increasing body of interpretations, however, these
assumptions are false. These interpretations occur as an element of
ongoing activity, as part of continuing and integrated courses of conduct
determining and exercising authority; the interpreters are executive officials, administrative agencies with programmatic responsibility for implementing statutory regimes, and subject to oversight that may be
political as well as judicial; and, finally, the interpreted texts are intransitive in character-rather than provide answers to the problems that induced it to act, the legislature has created official bodies to deal with
those problems on a continuing basis, within parameters it sets by statute.' This essay seeks to begin an examination of the difficulties that may
* Betts Professor of Law, Columbia University. Among the friends who read early drafts and
made helpful comments, special thanks are owed to Bernie Black, Philip Frickey, Kent Greenawalt,
Jeff Lubbers, Eben Moglen, Henry Monagham, Richard Pierce, Rick Pildes, Steven Ross, Roy
Schotland, Richard Thomas, and Seth Zinmann. This paper was submitted to this Symposium in
the Summer of 1990, and does not consider developments since then. The Abraham M. Buchman
Fund for Administrative Law's financial support is gratefully acknowledged.
1. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the AdministrativeState, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 369 (1989); see
also Diver, Statutory Interpretationin the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 551 n. 11
(1985). Some judicially administered statues have the same characteristic-the Sherman Act come
quickly to mind. We treat such statutes as providing a framework for common-law development.
They will not be further considered here.
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be created by using the paradigm of episodic, judicial interpretation of a
determinate text when dealing with the very different world of the administered statute. Its immediate concern is with the implications of the
recent judicial flight from reliance on legislative history in interpretation,
yet more general problems also exist.
The general problem that motivates this paper is one often worried
about for judges, but that has particular difficulty and significance for
administrative agencies-that of distinguishing successfully between the
worlds of politics and law, and providing ourselves with some assurance
that an agency will act in accordance with "law." Politics has an open
and conceded role in administrative government, as it does not for
courts; and yet we also expect an agency to act according to law. Perhaps especially at a time when the abuses of political oversight and the
political side of agency action are much in public view-the savings and
loan debacle, and the scandals at the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, for example-attending to how a "rule of law culture ' 2
might be maintained against these pressures is a useful exercise. The burden of this paper is that the use of legislative history may have an importance in the agency context for maintaining law against politics, however
3
one regards its use at the judicial level.
I.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AGENCY READER

Two examples may sharpen and make concrete some of the differences between agency and judicial reading of statutes, and their increasing significance in American law. The Railway Safety Appliance Act of
18934 ("RSAA") was a largely transitive statute that imposed on American railroads the requirement to adopt a number of specified safety improvements. Among them was a provision making it unlawful after a
future date, extendable by order of the Interstate Commerce Commission
("ICC"), "to haul or permit to be hauled or used on its line any car used
in moving interstate traffic not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact, and which can be uncoupled without the necessity of
2. Shane, The Separation of Powers and the Rule of Law: The Virtues of "Seeing the Trees" 30
WM. & MARY L. REV. 375 (1989).

3. The relative indifference of the text to the question of how judges interpret statutes is artificial. Judicial condemnation ofjudicial use of legislative history as "rummag[ing] through unauthoritative materials," Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 109 S.Ct. 2558 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
would inevitably affect the psychology of agency use, whether or not an agency was ever reversed for
"error" in relying on such materials in its own decisional processes. History teaches us, moreover,
that judicial refusals to consider the political history of legislation easily turn into the substitution of
judicial pleasure to that of the legislative body. See infra text accompanying note 25.
4. 27 Stat. 531 (1893) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-43 (1982)). Cf.Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some Comments on Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 427 (1989).
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men going between the ends of the cars." Among the questions not immediately resolved on the face of this statute is whether the statute focuses on the equipment or on the event of coupling. If the former, it
would not be a violation to use a car that could couple with some but not
all cars it might encounter, or whose coupling mechanisms were out of
repair, so that in particular instances men might have to go between the
cars to effect a coupling or uncoupling; if the latter, any coupling or uncoupling not automatic-in-fact would be a violation.
Because the ICC had twice been persuaded to postpone the effective
date of this requirement, it did not take effect until August 1, 1900. On
August 5, 1900, a brakeman lost a hand while attempting to make a manual coupling between a Southern Pacific engine equipped with an automatic coupler type widely adopted for use on freight cars and a dining
car equipped with an incompatible passenger car coupler. His suit for
damages then put before the courts the question whether the act had
been violated or not. In 1904, eleven years after the statute's adoption,
and after the Eighth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion,5 the
Supreme Court concluded that the act had been violated, reasoning from
purpose and to a limited extent legislative history that (among other con6
clusions) the statute required compatibility-in-fact.
Notice, however, that this question had been urgent for several years
before August of 1900, in forms carrying heavier economic consequences
than the prospect of negligence liability to brakeman Johnson. The
Southern Pacific, indeed all the nation's interstate railroads, had to decide what investments to make in equipping cars with couplers, what
policies were permitted or required for interline exchanges, and what
might be the legal consequences of failing to keep coupler systems in
repair. Against what might seem the obvious impulse to uniformityvariations between cars contributed heavily to the terrible carnage in the
yards that generated the pressure for this legislation 7-were a variety of
concerns vivid in the history of the act and of the times: automatic coupling was an emerging technology, and dozens of designs competed; it was
impossible to say which would be the best one, and for what purposes; 8
each railroad was accustomed to make its own purchase decisions; and it
5. Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 117 F. 462 (8th Cir. 1902).
6. Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196 U.S. 1 (1904).

7. The text account draws on materials collected in P. STRAUSS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGAL METHODS 132-87 (prov. ed. 1990). See, in particular, Kohn v. McNulta, 147 U.S. 238
(1893); 24 CONG. REC. 1246-51, 1273-88, 1370-76, 1416-18 (1893).
8. One might wish different qualities for freight cars than for passenger cars, and durability
was untested.
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was feared by some that fixing on a single required design would defeat
many entrepreneurs and confer monopoly profits on one.
In counseling their clients about the impact of the new law on their
rolling stock, railroad lawyers might, of course, simply have attempted to
project what judicial reasoning ultimately would be, to the extent technique permitted-as they might project the interpretation of a contract
or will they were drafting. 9 Yet the fact is that the railroads (and the
railroad unions) were in a continuing relationship with a body, the ICC,
that had been given some responsibility for implementing the statute,
that was in a position to indicate its own understanding of the meaning of
its provisions, and that (as a participant in the political process) was well
situated to appreciate such legislative understandings as there may have
been. That relationship invited negotiation and counseling, over time, as
the industry worked toward understanding and meeting its obligations;
and the character of the ICC permitted political as well as judicial dialogues about its developing understandings and implementation plans.
The ICC's annual reports and the decisions it made (after full hearings) on the requests for extension provided, as it were, formats for developing appreciation of these issues and expressing conclusions widely
circulated and read within the communities most concerned.' 0 They reflected dialogue not only with industry but also with the Congress to
which they were ostensibly addressed, and whose political interests they
were written to satisfy. Of course, resistance to the positions the ICC
took, or awareness that further legislation was required, might have
emerged, but when neither did-the readings the ICC supplied were accepted and acted upon---one might reasonably treat the result as reflecting an accepted, evolving interpretation.
The experience within these communities was of taking judgments
and making investments over time, under a statute whose meaning was,
in an important sense, emerging with the years. Whatever it had
9. As they were not the drafters of the statute, however, they would have rather less capacity
than in the case of contract or will personally to influence the outcome of an anticipated, later
reading.
10. The ICC's view that compatibility-in-fact would be required was first expressed in its Seventh Annual Report-the report for 1893, the year in which the statute was adopted. 7 ICC ANN.
REP. 76 (1893). Over the years, the compatibility theme (which had also marked the legislative
history, see P. STRAUSS, supra note 7, was frequently repeated. See, e.g., 10 ICC ANN. REP. 94
(1896), 13 ICC ANN. REP. 53 (1899). The problem of keeping the couplers in repair, about which
no hint can be found in the original legislative history, first appears in the last of these, with the
remark that "such a coupler is not automatic in the sense contemplated by the law." 13 ICC ANN.
REP. at 53. This report is the first in which a Commission inspector is mentioned, and following
reports recount successful requests to Congress for additional inspection forces, and recognition of
the value of this effort-without, however, any change being made in the underlying statute. 14 ICC
ANN. REP. 79-84 (1900); 16 ICC ANN. REP. 57-59 (1902).
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"meant" in 1893, the body of actions that had been taken by August 1,
1900-by the ICC and by the railroads and the railroad unions, with
Congress regularly informed-gave the statute a working meaning at
that time that inevitably was richer than had obtained at the legislative
moment. While in the instance the Supreme Court reached the same
point with respect to brakeman Johnson's hand, as commission and industry had been reaching for together under Congress's watchful eye in
considering the nation's car fleet, that coincidence ought not to obscure
the very different processes involved.
The impact of the presence of an agency reader is the more striking
when one moves to a statute that could not reasonably be imagined itself
to have resolved the issues with which industry and agency were required
to deal. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966
("NTMVSA"),I like the Railroad Safety Appliances Act of 1893, sought
to force the development and deployment of safety technology. Where
Congress in 1893 could visualize the general problem and the solution to
be pursued, the Congress of 1966 could not; it was not prepared to decide
what measures should be taken to render cars acceptably safe. Authority
was given to an agency within the Department of Commerce (soon to be
transferred to the Department of Transportation) to decide, following
rather elaborately stated procedures, what safety standards would be
"reasonable, practicable, and appropriate for the particular type of motor
vehicle ... for which it is prescribed," would "meet the need for motor
vehicle safety" and could "be stated in objective terms."' 2 This Congress
had neither time nor capacity to attend to legislative detail; it identified
the seriousness of the problem, provided parameters and procedures for
action, and specified an executive actor to see to it, under its supervision
and the courts', that something would be done. This is, then, an excel13
lent example of an intransitive statute.
Like its near-contemporary, the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970,14 the text of the NTMVSA occasionally reflects what might
euphemistically be described as legislative compromise. Unable, for example, to agree precisely on the extent to and manner in which costs
should be taken into account in the pursuit of safety, Congress provided
11. Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (1966) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1392(f)(3), 1391(2), 1392(a).
13. See Rubin, supra note 1. The materials on which the text discussion of the NTMVSA is
based are drawn from P. STRAUSS, supra note 7, at 531-751. See also J. MASHAW & D. HARFST,
THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990).

14. 29 U.S.C. § 651; see also Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst.,
448 U.S. 607 (1980).
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a formula that could be administered, having been assured by the intended administrator that he understood a balance had to be struck in
some fashion. 15 While recognition that Congress often fails to decide important matters has led a few to revived interest in the delegation doctrine,16 the prevailing view is to accept the resulting intransitivity in the
belief that procedures and other commitments to regularity by administrators can substitute for the law Congress cannot be thought itself to
have created.1 7 Of course, Congress does decide some issues, and determining which they are and how they were resolved present questions of
statutory interpretation.' 8 That process threatens a similar skew between
the judicial paradigm and the agency-regulation reality.
Take, for example, the NTMVSA's requirement that standards be
"objective." A braking standard must be testable, and that implies that
such a standard will specify vehicular speed, the traction qualities of the
road surface, and stopping distances. As soon as one gets into this problem, one realizes that testing braking on a road surface in itself changes
the quality of the surface, because bits of rubber will adhere to it and
make it slicker. The stickiness coefficient of the road will change with
use. An ongoing process in which such problems are recognized and
discussed might produce as an accommodation the specification of a
margin of error for the probable variation in road surface quality; that
would permit a braking system to pass the required standard despite
what might otherwise seem a somewhat subpar performance. One might
15. E.g., The General Counsel of the Commerce Department stated in a letter to the
Committee:
The tests of reasonableness of cost, feasibility, and adequate lead time should be included
among those factors which the Secretary could consider in making his total judgment.
The Committee intends that safety shall be the overriding consideration in the issuance of standards under this bill. The committee recognizes ... that the Secretary will
necessarily consider reasonableness of cost, feasibility and adequate leadtime.
S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966); see also 112 CONG. REC. 13601 (1966), and the
risible dialogue on this subject among Senators Hart (Mich.), Ribicoff (Conn.), and Pastore (R.I.) in
the Senate Hearings of March 15, 1966, reproduced in P. STRAUSS supra note 7, at 635-46.
16. See Industrial Union Dep't., 448 U.S. at 671 (Rehnquist J., concurring); but compare the
concession in the several opinions in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) that judicially
manageable standards for delegation are unavailable.
17. See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737
(D.D.C. 1971); 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3:15 (2d ed. 1978). For a particu-

larly candid Supreme Court recognition that Congress leaves important issues undecided, and is
permitted to do so, see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
18. In the Chevron decision, the Supreme Court identified two steps to be taken in any case
involving statutory interpretation by an agency of a statute within its mandate. The first step requires the Court to determine, using "traditional tools" of statutory construction, whether Congress
has resolved the issue presented. 467 U.S. at 848 n.9. This is essentially the inquiry described in the
text. If Congress is found not to have resolved the matter, then the court is to accept any reasonable
agency construction. Id.
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expect such outcomes from an agency that learns across a range of its
activities about the inevitable imprecisions of testing measurements, and
one might believe that industry could accommodate to, even welcome,
them. That expectation might be enhanced by awareness that as these
discussions are continuing, the agency is also in continuous political contact with the President and the Congress, to which (independently of the
courts) it will have to justify the seriousness and appropriateness of its
efforts.
On the other hand, litigation will present judges only with the particular stickiness coefficient problem, not its generalizable character; of
necessity, they will encounter in the case both the standard and the acknowledgment by the agency that it does not expect it to be met precisely-that it is willing to make accommodations to varying testing
conditions. By itself, this episode may seem quite strange. If the judges
are persuaded that the requirement to state standards "in objective
terms" embodies a discrete congressional decision that each standard
must permit strict replication of results, not a working objective for the
agency, then a braking standard that survives judicial scrutiny will be
hard to come by. 19 In their insightful new book, Jerry Mashaw and
David Harfst persuasively make the case that the essential cessation of
standard-generation by the National Highway Traffic Safety Agency can
20
be ascribed in good part to just such judicial failures of understanding.
The examples of the RSAA and the NTMVSA are themselves dispute-oriented, and so only hint at what may be the largest of the differences between the ordinary judicial and agency contexts for statutory
interpretation. For the courts, the statutes arrive with the particular disputes; agencies have a history and memory that courts lack for most statutory problems they see. Agencies are almost wholly the creature of
their statutes, with an overlay of practices and understandings built on
them and of judgments made and acted upon within the discretion that
the statute is understood to confer. The agency's daily course of business
presents myriad opportunities for reexamining and possibly shifting the
meanings ascribed to its statutes. Impetus for change is provided in part
by the facts that happen to arise before the agency; facts drive it just as
they do courts applying the common law. From year to year, in the
dynamic of government, new statutes accrete, presidential administrations and the agency's own political leadership change, the general char19. Paccar, Inc. v. NHTSA, 573 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1979); see
also Chrysler Corp. v. DOT, 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972).
20. J. MASHAW & D. HARFST, supra note 13, at 89-103.
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acter and political composition of the Congress fluctuate, civil servants
pass in and out the revolving door, however slowly-and with this flux
the statutes acquire meanings they never previously had, and lose others
that once were obvious. And they do so not only in the particular decisions of the agency heads, but also in the daily humdrum of the civil
servants who do its work.
The differences between the statute the judge interprets (under our
unarticulated assumptions about occasion, interpreter, and text) and the
statute the agency interprets seem like those between "discrete" and "relational" contracts, as presented in current disputes about interpreting
contracts. 21 In the classic model, contracts are best viewed as consentcentered transactions between parties to an episodic transaction; a contract is imagined as attempting at the moment of agreeing to capture all
possible future consequences of the parties' behavior in relation to each
other concerning the agreed-on transaction. In criticism of that model,
some scholars point out that many contracts are centered not on discrete
transactions whose consequences could even imaginably be captured at a
given point in time, but on relationships that continue over time, that are
"heavily relational and intertwined, and not discrete at all."' 22 The par-

ties to such contracts "cannot plan for every contingency and must continue to plan and adjust their duties throughout the relationship; trouble
is expected as a normal part of the relationship; unlike the parties in a
discrete bargaining process, the parties in an intertwined relationship
have an incentive to share both benefits and burdens, and anticipate future cooperation. '2 3 Changing the underlying assumptions about contracting in this way requires a thoroughgoing change in approach; so,
also, as one moves from the discrete statute and its judicial interpreter to
intransitive statutes administered by agencies. This essay takes no more
24
than initial steps in that direction.
21. The analogy is offered hesitantly by one who has had little exposure to the world of contracts scholarship, but with some encouragement from colleagues who have, and with significant
help from a synthesis essay they commended to me as highly reliable, Linzer, Uncontracts: Context,
Contorts, and the RelationalApproach, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 139. That essay contains a wealth
of references to the relevant contracts scholarship. Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. ECON. 426 (1976), draws a similar analogy, in the service of offering a justification
for much regulation by comparison with long term ("administered" or "relational") contracts.
22. Linzer, supra note 21, at 156, relying especially on the work of Ian MacNeil.
23. Id. at 157.
24. See Rubin, supra note 1,which generated for me the possible significance for interpretation
of the element of intransitivity. The ideas presented here have parallels to, but are not quite the same
as, those Philip Frickey and William Eskridge are pursuing under the label "dynamic statutory
interpretation"-Professor Eskridge in the pages of this symposium-or that Professors Aleinikoff
and Dworkin articulate in their respective writings about statutory interpretation. See Eskridge &
Frickey, Statutory Interpretationas PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Farber, Statutory Interpretationand Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281 (1989); Aleinikoff, Patersen v. Mc-
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The organic nature of agency relationships with their statutes, that
agencies essentially live the process of statutory interpretation, makes it
of special importance to see how that occurs. The character of the
agency as interpreter, that it acts in the world of politics as well as that of
law, further emphasizes the inquiry. In some senses, of course, we know
that judges, too, are political-that they may be merely the longest lived
of our politicians; assuring that they do not "exercise WILL instead of
JUDGMENT, .. .[substituting] their pleasure to that of the legislative
body" 25 is the continuing challenge, and one expects always to find Realists who can persuasively show that it has not been fully met. Yet agency
officials are concededly political. Unlike judges, they serve limited terms,
from which they may be dismissed; their wages in theory and their resources in reality are hostage to the appropriations process; they spend
much of their time testifying to congressional committees, responding to
inquiries or demands from the President, members of Congress, or assorted presidential or congressional offices; they may be called to account
for the decisions they take in ways a judge could never conceive for her
function.
II.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN AGENCY PRACTICE

Legislative history has a centrality and importance for agency lawyers that might not readily be conceived by persons who are outside government and are accustomed to considering its relevance only to actual
or prospective judicial resolution of discrete disputes. Imagine the law
library of a government agency-the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Department of Agriculture. In addition to the reporters and
the computer terminals, you will find there an unusually extensive collection of legislative materials. Alongside the statutes for which the agency
is responsible, you will find shelf after shelf of their legislative historycollections that embrace not only printed materials such as might make
their way to a depositary library, but also transcripts of relevant hearings, correspondence, and other informal traces of the continuing interactions that go on between an agency and Capitol Hill as a statute is
being shaped in the legislative process, and perhaps afterwards in course
of implementation. You may also find there files of correspondence with
the Office of Management and Budget and with the White House, generLean: UpdatingStatutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20 (1988); R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE
(1986) and, perhaps especially, Eskridge, Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
609 (1990). Intransitivity and agency administration are not universal characteristics of statutes, and
the inquiry here is limited to such statutes.
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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ated while statutory proposals pend or in response to the question
whether the President should sign enacted legislation. No part of legislative history as courts normally regard it, nonetheless these files mark and
in significant respects may contribute to the agency's stance toward
emerging legislation-as records of "where we have been," they suggest
what it expects will be entailed for its programs by the matters under
consideration.
Imagine now the work of that library. These materials do not languish. Consciously or unconsciously, the question of statutory meaning
is at the core of virtually all the agency does. "Authority" lurks in each
rule, each proposal for action. If it must be demonstrated, the responsible attorney will make that demonstration not only in terms of statutory
language but also-with effort in proportion to importance-after thorough attention to these materials. Through them she acquires a sense of
political history and possibility that will both suggest and constrain.
Choice between alternative readings of statutory text, explicit or implicit,
recurs for each attorney many times in any significant piece of legal
work. Sometimes, of course, that choice appears hardly if at all to the
busy attorney: a particular view is already well established within institutional ethos, has been ingested by the attorney as part of her own analytic
equipment, is little challenged by the particular circumstances that animate the present piece of work. But if the view isn't well established, or
if it isn't yet hers, or if the circumstances carry with them the impulse for
change, we expect her to pore through those materials, as she does, seeking help in understanding and/or justification.
As we have already noted, the agency is almost wholly the creature
of its statutes, and its daily grist of business produces constant and dynamic change. In this process, prior as well as present political forces
play a continuing role. They do so perhaps most obviously through the
words of the statute; language rarely if ever changes so quickly that even
current intuitive readings are free of the deposit of understandings the
statute's writers would have shared. Prior political forces continue to
act, as well, through the agency's institutional memory, the set of understandings, vivid in the minds of its civil servants, what the statute has
"always" been understood to mean. And, for the newest of the agency's
personnel especially, those forces continue to act through the concrete
deposits of those forces-the legislative history and the agency's subsequent actions in relation to it.
One wants not to romanticize the impact of this history and its use,
and at the same time to observe its possible uses in the arena of contemporary political oversight that so distinguishes the contexts of agency and
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judicial interpretation. There is always the chance that it will be overwhelmed-at least for a time-by the contemporary politics of an Ann
Gorsuch or James Watt supported by the President in battles with the
Congress. When received, obviously enough, the history need be no
more definitive than the statute it accompanies; where the history of the
RSAA gives fairly clear signals on the issue of compatibility, that of the
NTMVSA only confirms that Congress papered over its failure to come
to closure on the question just how costs should be taken into account in
making judgments about safety. Even so, the staff of an agency enduring
over time and pursuing its mission will form understandings grounded in
its history, as it unfolds, that political leaders may find they have to respect if they do not wish to destroy morale or an internal sense of the
agency's legitimacy. The agency once charged with the generation of
safety standards is obliged to find a path within the range of disagreements it knows that formula to have concealed-to do so in a manner
likely to survive the political oversight to which it is immediately subject
as well as eventually to satisfy a reviewing court. That oversight will
likely occur before the same committee as produced the papered-over
formula; in the immediate wake of the legislation, one may find a high
degree of awareness just what the elements of disagreement were, how
much room and on what issues the agency has to exercise its own discretion. The path then taken will itself generate expectations and patterns
of action that acquire force with time.
III.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND "RULE-OF-LAW CULTURE"

We are accustomed to giving these expectations and patterns the
name "law," and to holding agencies to them, in a limited way, through
the medium of judicial review. Of course, courts finding that statutes are
indeterminate in important respects could respond by invoking the delegation doctrine but, as already noted, 26 they do not. Instead, they seek
other means of assuring themselves that agencies can be kept within
law's control and have acted within the law. Very occasionally, that may
be by a judicial supplying of constraints through "interpretation" of the
statute to supply the decision Congress omitted. 27 More often, they in26. See supra note 17.
27. The obvious contemporary example of this move is the plurality opinion in Industrial
Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980), which imposed a threshold requirement for assessing health hazards under the Occupational Safety and Health Act in the
face of demonstrable Congressional indecision on the issue of assessing costs in relation to safety and
few if any indications that it had even considered the requirement the Court found in the statutory
text. See Shapiro & McGarity, ReorientingOSHA: RegulatoryAlternatives and Legislative Reform, 6
YALE J. ON REG. 1, 46 n.259 (1989). The plurality indicated that it thought its only alternative to
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quire into agency procedures, reasoning processes, and the building and
honoring of internal constraints that conduce to regularity. 28 Agencies
actively solicit these results by regularly acting as if authority had always
to be justified and legality demonstrated; the courts' nonrecourse to the
delegation doctrine is purchased, as it were, by these demonstrations of
29
adherence to rule-of-law culture.
The political pressures operating on agency action at any given
point may be overt, as when a member of Congress submits an inquiry,
an oversight hearing looms, the Office of Management and Budget raises
questions based on economic impact analysis, or a high administration
official seeks a certain outcome; or they may be implicit-the product of
political appointments made with an eye to the appointee's program or
likely approach, or of a successful bureaucrat's intuitive knowledge what
course of action will avoid political reprisal or earn political credit. Any
resistance these pressures encounter may be the product, simply, of the
agency actor's own will, exercised within whatever room a variety of contending and often contradictory external forces afford. Yet one imagines
also that resistance derives from the play of past political force captured
in the legislative histories and decisions already taken. Every so often the
impulse to act or interpret in a given fashion will be met by refusal: "The
statutes don't permit that." "We've built up a set of expectations that
will unravel if we go that way." "Even if the words might be taken that
way in isolation, that's just inconsistent with what's been understood
since the statute was enacted; it would require an amendment to get us
there." "I don't see a fair reading of the legislative history that would
permit that interpretation." Such refusals are not lightly made, particularly if the current political forces are large ones; even if one didn't want
to agree with political superiors (often one wants to agree with them),
credibility and professional reputation if not job security are on the line.
finding this meaning in the statute was to hold it invalid for excessive delegation. 488 U.S. at 646.
That is a high level of provocation, and I do not intend to suggest that a Court persuaded that a
statute must be found invalid for excessive delegation (i.e., that it will be found to authorize an
agency to act outside law's necessary control) is unjustified in adopting an available interpretation
that establishes the necessary confidence in control-whether or not Congress could reasonably be
thought to have enacted the resulting regime. Note, however, that prior formulations about delegation, even permissive ones, do not admit to congressional indeterminacy. See J.W. Hampton & Co.
v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) ("If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the ... body . . . is directed to conform . . .") (emphasis added); Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944) ("[W]hether the definition sufficiently marks the field within
which the administrator is to act so that it may be known whether he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative will.") (emphasis added).
28. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983);
supra note 17.
29. See Strauss, supra note 4, at 442-43.
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If such refusals nonetheless occur they are, at least in contemplation, one
way in which agency personnel mark the elusive boundary between politics and law.
If this picture is well painted, we may find in it a number of recognizable elements. One is a basis for the judicial judgment, variously expressed and never more strongly than in Chevron, Inc., USA v. Natural
Resources Defense Council,30 that agency judgments about statutory
meaning are entitled with substantial frequency to acceptance. Except
for the rare case in which a statute's indeterminacy provokes so much
judicial concern about the possibilities of control as to provoke the judges
themselves to read the statute to cabin the indeterminacy, 3' one confidently expects the reaction will be that of the Chevron Court:
In these cases, the administrator's interpretation represents a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests and is entitled
to deference: the regulatory scheme is technical and 'complex, the
agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and
the decision involves reconciling conflicting policies. Congress intended to accommodate both interests, but did not do so itself on the
level of specificity presented by this case. Perhaps that body consciously desired the administrator to strike the balance at this level,
thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better position to do
so; perhaps it simply did not consider the question at this level; and
perhaps Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side of the
question, and those on each side decided to take their chances with the
scheme devised by the agency. 32For judicial purposes it matters not
which of these things occurred.
Note that the agency is not acting beyond judicial control; the opening
sentences suggest that agency judgment may be reviewed for abuse of
discretion in the accustomed mode-one that permits inquiry into consistency, reasoning and judgment. 33 Nonetheless, the Court has acknowledged three propositions, striking yet appropriate in the context of a
statute committed to an agency reader: that the statute is indeterminate;
that primary responsibility for giving it shape over time lies elsewhere;
and (as the discussion in Chevron following the quoted paragraph particularly emphasizes) that that responsibility will appropriatelybe exercised
under the oversight of the political as well as the judicial branches.
Judicial acceptance of such agency responsibility seems a corollary
of the choices Congress makes in committing a statute to administrative
30.
31.
32.
33.
Citizens

467 U.S. 837 (1984).
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
467 U.S. at 865 (footnotes omitted).
Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983); see also
to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
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reading in the first instance. The processes by which agencies generate
statutory readings permit, yet tend to smooth, understanding complex,
interdependent, and intricate statutory schemes and adapting them to the
changing circumstances of society and of the legal order as a whole.
Congress finds it hard enough to act initially; courts are brought to statutory puzzles episodically and piecemeal, neither bearing responsibility for
the whole nor having the resources and incentive for comprehensive understanding. The agency's constant exposure to its statutes, its continuing immersion in their political histories and interdependent possibilities,
and its responsibilities for program make it a particularly capable reader;
its continuing interactions with the many communities affected by the
statutes-and with their political representatives in Congress and the
White House-give its readings, in any event, a real-world influence
courts would be hard put, and foolishly advised, to deny. And the connection to the past provided by personnel and the attachment to language-in-history, together with an effective obligation of explanation to
earn respect and judicial review for reasonableness and procedural sufficiency provide some basis for connecting those readings to law.
Endorsing political as well as judicial oversight gives the character
of the connection to the past particular importance. Let us accept the
Supreme Court's concession in Chevron that statutes are often (if not always) indeterminate-not in the sense that they mean nothing, that "oranges" could be substituted for "rice" in a statute providing price
supports and acreage restrictions for the latter, but in the sense that they
often mean no one fixed thing, that they leave open an envelope of possible understandings among which a definitive choice of intended or necessary or correct meaning cannot be made. We are then very near, if not
precisely at, the insight that critical legal scholars reduce to "power,"
positivists to "chaos," public choice theorists to "rational self-interest
maximization," and pragmatic legal scholars want to call "law." The
way the pragmatists want to do that, as Robin West points out in her
contribution to this symposium 34 is by asserting the constraining character of that tradition or context within which judgments are made. However a member of the public or a member of Congress might understand
the possibilities opened by, say, the NTMVSA, a person who is a lawyer
for the Department of Transportation-and who acts within the enveloping history and traditions of the DOT, and who acts in relation to the
political history as well as the text of the statutes applicable to the
34. West, The Meaning of Equality and the Interpretive Turn, 66 CHI-KENT L. REV. 451
(1990).
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DOT-that person will come to a more bounded judgment, a judgment
outside the wholly personal, a judgment that (even if not wholly determined) may therefore be described as one of law.
One needs to pay close attention to the importance for that argument of the legislative history component. From the perspective of pragmatic interpretation, it is not only important to observe that traditions
count; it is also central to see what those traditions are, to have some
sense of how they contribute to the formation of judgment and to its
articulation in the swirling world of current politics. Because part of
what distinguishes agencies from courts in the business of statute-reading
is that we accept a legitimate role for current politics in the work of
agencies, the question then becomes, in important respects, titrating just
35
how much politics and just how much law there is in the mixture. It is
just this fact of accepted current political influence or oversight of agency
work-product that lends importance to the continued use of past political
history in agency statute-reading.
IV.

SEPARATION OF POWERS IMPLICATIONS

Imagine two contexts for an interchange between an administrative
official and a political overseer. The administrator has to resolve in some
specific setting a question of statutory meaning in a framework formally
set by prior legislation. As language, the relevant passage is problematic;
but the politician would say that current politics calls for a particular one
of the available readings and is prepared to demand that reading. In case
one, our official repairs to the library we have described and investigates
the political history of the provisions in question-that is to say, their
legislative history and subsequent development; she concludes that today's politically desired reading is not a fair one in light of that context
36
and thus causes the agency to frustrate the current political demand.
In case two, the library is closed-use of legislative history is impermissi35. See Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 CHI.KENT L. REV. 123 (1989) and Farber, Democracy and Disgust: Reflections on Public Choice, 65
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 161 (1989).
36. The case in which the bureaucrat finds ("is able to find," for the more cynically inclined)
history to support what current politics demands presents other possible issues. When she reaches
the outcomes current politics has demanded, law has served as less of a constraint on their influence.
We might imagine, however, that dressing her conclusion up in the language of history and what its
materials command may to some extent have obscured the influence of current politics, and in this
way secured an unearned legitimacy for that conclusion. One thus has issues of candor about the
basis for an exercise of public authority that will in any event occur, rather than constraints over the
exercise of that authority. A person or society might prefer to have more candid exercises of less
constrained authority, rather than the combination of constraints and camouflage; my preference is
for the possibility of constraint.
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ble-and the traditions of statute-reading emphasize text-based approaches. Agency history-"the way we have always read the statute"and arguments grounded in reconciling elaborate and complex schemes
remain available; yet it seems to me evident that closing the legislative
history library would impair the agency's defenses against current politics. Text-based approaches don't pay much attention to agency traditions, and (for all the occasional references to Nineteenth Century
dictionaries) invite contemporary readings; 37 thus, the relative force of
contemporary politics is much increased in case two as against case one.
The responses available to a contemporary politician's commanding
"Why don't you read the statute my way"? have been sharply
diminished.
This observation does not in itself establish that case two is the less
desirable outcome. One account of our transaction would find in case
two a distinct normative improvement. This would be the account of
those who conceptualize the relationships between administrative agencies and elected politicians (usually representatives in the Congress but
sometimes also Senators or even, occasionally, the President) as principal-agent relationships in the game-theoretic or economic sense. 38 The
problem to be solved, on this view, consists of finding ways to monitor
the agent to assure that it adheres to the wishes of its principal. Formally, those wishes are expressed in legislation, but the literature addresses the problem in current time, as an issue of oversight. Just as a
rational judge will think that honoring a system of precedent will tend to
give her own judgments force in the future, one might suppose that a
rational legislator might wish to encourage respect for past legislative
judgments as a means of assuring the future force of his own legislative
acts; nonetheless, the oversight issue is presented as one of securing satis39
factory results for today's constituents today.
On this view of matters, then, the administrative agency behaves
ideally when it responds fully and intuitively to current political inputs.
Whatever impedes this outcome--conflicting contemporary political signals (such as may be received from various congressional committees, the
37. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990); Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509
(1988); compare Scalia, JudicialDeference to Administrative Interpretationof Law, 1989 DUKE L.J.
511, 521.

38. The literature is invoked, and an ambitious effort at such an analysis is made, in Revesz,
Specialized Courts and the Administrative Law-Making System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1139-47

(1990). Revesz, for his purposes, assumes that current and past political pressures from Congress
will not differ. Id. at 1145 n. 145, and appears to assume that those pressures will be congruent with
the law bearing on agency action. Id.
39. See, e.g., McCubbins & Sullivan, Congress: Structure and Policy.
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White House, etc.) that permit playing one off against another, or internalized bureaucratic resistance-frees the agency agent to ignore its politically representative principal. Because those principals are themselves
regarded as agents operating in a highly disciplined interaction with their
principals, the public-a relationship that justifies their powerwhatever thus frees the agency agent to ignore current political signals
would be said to place its acts outside political legitimacy. For these
observers, the substitute determiner of administrative action is merely the
personal self-interest of the concerned bureaucrats, a self-interest that
will find expression in agency "capture" by regulated interests or other
undesirable results.
A. Delegation
Seeing that the case two rules would diminish an agency's capacity
to resist current political oversight serves to underscore that what is at
stake is the normative claim that agency action should be mediated by
influences other than, or at least in addition to, those politics. That claim
is readily identified with separation of powers reasoning. Separation of
powers reasoning focuses on legislature, executive and court as agents,
rather than as principals, and-with the possible exception of the executive-denies binding force to the mere politics of these agents. Legislative action is to occur through the passage of statutes; courts are
authorized to act only according to law, not policy; such discretion as the
executive may have in the ordinary affairs of government must be
cabined by law. 4° These limitations reflect the agency of these institutions; they are the mechanism by which their principal, the people, is to
be protected against the loss of its power to the tyranny that would result
if any of the three were to acquire monopoly over government power.
40. While what we know as the delegation doctrine is ordinarily articulated in terms of what
Congress cannot do ("Congress cannot delegate legislative authority"), it is often more helpful to
consider it as expressing limits on permissible executive discretion. "Discretion," any administrative
lawyer knows, is a problematic concept. As antonym to "ministerial," the Supreme Court pronounced in the magisterial Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 166 (1803), it is an authority beyond the
control of law. "RT]here exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion. The subjects are
political. They respect the nation, not individual rights, and being entrusted to the executive, the
decision of the executive is conclusive." Id. at 166.
When we use "discretion" in describing the ordinary domestic affairs of government, however,
we are far from the conclusion that "there is no law to apply," indeed we work hard to assure that
courts do have a role in checking its exercise in a wide variety of ways. See Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971); Monagham, Marbury and the Administrative
State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1983). While the delegation doctrine is a well-known fraud in its
conventional garb, since these days Congress enacts few laws that do not delegate legislative authority (Rubin, supra note 1), it remains the price of such delegations that the discretion they confer be
subject to the control of law. See supra note 29.
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In their most stringent form, as expressed by John Locke, separation
of power limitations forbid subdelegation; "[t]he power of the legislative
being derived from the people by a positive voluntary grant and institution, can be no other, than what the positive grant conveyed, which being
only to make laws, and not to make legislators, the legislative can have
no power to transfer the authority of making laws, and place it in other
hands."' 41 If observation of the limitations in this form is no longer conceivable, as most would agree it is not, their remaining force lies in the
proposition that the authority relationship between legislature and
agency is to be one characterized by law rather than, simply, politics; in
particular, that aspect of law that embodies the constraints of separation
of powers suggests the particular importance for the agency/legislative
relationship of statutory enactment-in separation of powers theory, that
is, statutes are the characteristic means by which the legislature requires
an agency to act, and that requirement persists until replacement statutes
are enacted. To put this argument in a somewhat different way-what
separation of powers theory suggests, so far as legislative politics is concerned, is that the political history that attends the legislature's characteristic act of political legitimacy (the enactment of a statute) is the only
political history that has a claim to command agency action. An approach favoring political action by Congress or its members that is not
attached to statutory action, at the expense of political action that results
in enactment of a statute, disserves the separation of powers.
B.

The President

Before pursuing the possible implications of locking the agency out
of its library for congressional relationships with agencies, we might
pause to note that there could be other implications as well. Locking the
agency out of its library also increases the effective political authority of
the current President and may shift the balance of authority, as between
them, toward him. 42 Empowerment of the President could occur in two
ways. Most directly, the general counsel and her agency will have lost
some of their weapons to resist policy guidance in dealings with the President if she can't say, "given the legislative history, we can't read the
statute that way." The agency is the repository of expert knowledge
41. J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 87 (R. Cox. ed. 1982).
42. As may be apparent, the model implicit in the textual discussion distinguishes "agencies"
from the President, supposing that the President may have characteristic relationships with administrative agencies but that their authority is nonetheless theirs and not his-whether they are "independent" or "executive" agencies. See Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government. Separation
of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984).
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about the legislative process that generated or failed to generate statutory
change. That knowledge provides a means for resisting the President on
the sleeve of Congress, a means associated at least fictionally with law. It
provides an anchor for the "Duties" the Constitution indicates may
43
properly be assigned to the agency, not the President.
The second way in which the President might be empowered would
be if the abandonment of legislative history served, overall, to weaken
Congress' controls. It may well work this way. One comparing the capacities of the President and Congress (more precisely, committees and
members of Congress) to exercise contemporary oversight controls could
well conclude-even considering the contributions of such leveling institutions as the General Accounting Office and the Congressional Budget
Office-that the President is likely to be more adept. One could believe,
too, that judicial disregard of legislative history, paired with Chevron's
counsel of deference to agency readings, creates pressure to enact definitive (discrete, transitive) legislation Congress is unlikely to be able to
meet. The Presidential gains from such moves seem not unconnected to
the phenomenon of an increasingly Republican judiciary and a near-permanent Republican presidency. 44 These impacts appear especially dramatic if the government is equated with the presidency, as the Justices
who are most consistently formalist about statutory interpretation might
45
like to do.
C.

Congress

The implications for Congress are the more striking if we focus on
its own operation. From this perspective, one sees that a retreat from
legislative history would weaken the controls over agency action that
could be thought to continue to work on behalf of the enacting Congress.
From that Congress, only the words of the statute then would remain,
while the current Congress's political authority might have been enhanced. The President has gained political authority over the agencies;
for Congress, the picture is more complex-the authority of the legislating Congress is diminished while the political authority of contemporary
members of Congress may be enhanced.
This more complex outcome is one that also ought to be troubling
from a separation of powers perspective. At any given moment, we can
imagine that the two Congresses just described co-exist, the Congress
43.
powers
44.
45.

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. i; compare the Necessary and Proper Clause's reference to
vested "in any Department or Officer." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
See Ross, Reagan Realism Comes to Detroit, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 399.
Compare Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 659 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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that legislates for the future and the Congress that exercises current
political oversight authority. In constitutional contemplation Congress
legislates. The legislating Congress is the one that generates statutes and
legislative history. The oversight Congress is the one that stresses constituent-service, attempting to influence agency action in the here and
now, without passing statutes-acting, as has been fashionable to accuse
it recently, as a counter-executive. What we need to consider is that letting go of legislative history may have the effect of putting a premium on
oversight. It may make it more profitable to a member of Congress, torn
between one role as a member of the legislating Congress and another as
a member of the oversight Congress, to pay attention to being a member
of the oversight Congress. What is done in making legislation doesn't
count as much any more. Moreover, since on this hypothesis the agency
is not going to be paying nearly as much attention to what went on during the process of legislating as it used to, our hypothetical member is
going to have to put that much more energy into oversight to see to it
that it toes the line, that it stays on track in the here-and-now. Moving
away from legislative history, then, may well exacerbate the tendency of
Congress to act as counter-executive. 46
V.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND THE CHANGING
CHARACTER OF CONGRESS

The debate raging over the value of legislative history, addressed at
length elsewhere in this Symposium, is a debate that focuses on its use by
courts in interpreting statutes. Since early in this century, and over the
past fifty years in particular, American courts have made significant use
of the political history of legislation in their efforts to interpret it. The
growth in that practice strikingly parallels the emergence of the statute
as, at first, the common-law's competitor and, more recently, as the foundational instrument of the legal order. The availability of presidential
messages, printed committee reports, transcripts of debate, and other accompaniments of the legislative process permitted courts closer under46. Compare Revesz supra note 38 (analysis of the impact of changing review mechanisms on
congressional-agency relations.) Any such influence, admittedly, would be hard to quantify. Many
other factors point Congress toward the counter-executive mode-for example, our recent penchant
for electing our President and the dominant congressional factions from separate parties. Congress's
habit of creating agencies to identify the particulars of measures to be taken has been ascribed, not
only to the complexity of contemporary regulatory problems, but also to the general political advantages of getting the credit for addressing a problem generally while simultaneously avoiding the
blame for detailed implementation and creating opportunities for future constituent service. Enacting legislation inescapably requires more resources to achieve, and promises less immediate reward
at the polls, than constituent service. See Rubin, supra note I and Strauss, supra note 4.
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standing of the political impulse behind statutory language-inevitably
incomplete-and in this way promoted a more effective partnership between legislative and judicial institutions, one that recognized legislation's political claim to primacy over common law. In their initial
appearances, high court references to these materials seemed a means of
controlling the resistance of common-law courts to the intrusions of statutes on the elegant uniformity (as it was imagined) of the common-law
framework and to their redistributive effect; 47 later expressions, parallel
to the New Deal retreat from judicial activism and fashioned by the same
Justices as effected that sweeping change in constitutional approach,
sharply subordinated the judicial impulse to create a coherent legal system to the particulars of Congress's will perceived in connection with a
given enactment.

48

While recent criticisms of the use of legislative history could be
thought strongly political in character, 49 at least two continuing changes
in the legal context add considerable force to those criticisms. The first is
the consequence of the post-modern insight. Just as it is one thing to
celebrate "the tenacity of a taught tradition" and another to attempt to
evaluate or shape traditions for their capacity to produce bounded results, 50 it is one matter to draw meaning from debates and reports pro47. Chief Justice Fuller's opinion in Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196 U.S. 1 (1904), discussed in supra text accompanying note 6, is a familiar early example; the opinion consults presidential messages, legislative reports, amendments, and senate debates as aids in deciding how to
interpret the statutory obligation to use "couplers coupling automatically by impact."
48. See especially the Supreme Court's 5-4 decision in United States v. American Trucking
Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534 (1940), long identified as a watershed decision upholding the use of legislative
history. The majority argues strongly for using that history, but it is unlikely that the dissentersincluding Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Stone--opposed its use as such. Stone, in particular, was
among the strongest proponents of thoughtful statutory interpretation at the time, writing that statutes must be recognized as a source for legal development superior to the common law; also important for Stone, however, was a central judicial role, placing on the judge responsibility for melding
common law and statutory law into a unified whole. Stone, The Common Law in the United States,
50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 12-16 (1936). The four dissenters in American Trucking, with sixty-five years'
experience on the Court among them, chose an interpretation that voiced this strong judicial role
and fostered general coherence. This was a role that, on the whole, the New Deal Court had repudiated in its flight from judicial activism. The five Justices of the majority had ten years' experience on
the Court among them, and chose an interpretation that focused more on understanding the most
recently enacted statute than on integrating this statute with the general corpus of federal law.
49. The four Justices of the current Court who have contributed most sharply to these criticisms are President Reagan's four appointees-the Chief Justice, Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia,
and Justice Kennedy. Compare supra text accompanying note 44.
50. Pound, The Economic Interpretationof Law and the Law of Torts, 53 HARV. L. REV. 365
(1940), is an early and forceful observer of the effect on professional conduct of ingrained habits of
thought, "the instinctive tendency of the lawyer to refer every case back to some general principle."
Id. at 382. Once one understands, however, that these patterns, too, are contingent and might possibly be manipulated in pursuit of some future end-that the heuristic of teaching, like common-law
decisions, are not only the present's embodiment of the past but also, and therefore, the means by
which the present shapes tomorrow's outcomes-one is consigned, at best, to paradox. Cf Grey,
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duced by legislators principally interested in influencing their colleagues
and oblivious to the external effects of what they say, and another to do
so if legislators and their staff believe that what they say will have its
principal effect after passage. Awareness of the uses to which legislative
history is put has contributed to the planned colloquy, the precatory
committee report, and other "abuses" with which contemporary lawyers
are familiar. The characterization of these devices as abuses is more
problematic than is often presented-if Congress in effect delegates decisions on most issues to a few major players, what they do without controversy is in a meaningful sense the action of the whole. 5' And, of course,
it continues to be the case that legislation has a political history, and that
placing the words enacted in the context of that political history will
illuminate them. Yet awareness of these propositions and of courts' consequent efforts to discern that history has contributed to behaviors that
seek to exploit the history for effects that might not have been achieved
directly through legislation. These behaviors make it increasingly difficult to discern reliably what forces actually contributed to the enactment
of a statute, if they do not frustrate the effort entirely.
The second and related change in legal context has been the
bureaucraticization of Congress, the emergence of large congressional
staffs whose work has largely supplanted open debate, and the concomitant growth of congressional lobbying activity. The legislative reports
and debates that underlay the Railway Safety Appliance Act of 189352
were the products of elected officials who had themselves studied the
problems and come to conclusions, and who were, transparently, reasoning with and informing one another about the precise shape of a desirable
outcome. The Congress of today is a bureaucracy of over 20,000-many
in agencies such as the Congressional Budget Office or the General Accounting Office, but thousands also in the offices of individual members
or on the staffs of congressional committees. The change reflects a draLangdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PrTr. L. REV. 1 (1983); West, supra, note 34 (especially citing the
works of Stanley Fish).
51. Compare Ross, The Attack on Legislative History as a Tool for Statutory Interpretation
(Testimony to the House Judiciary Committee) (asserting naivety of the view that colloquies and
precatory report language are neither considered relevant for legislative action nor controlled against
manipulative use) with National Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd.,
618 F.2d 819, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("Courts in the past have been able to rely on legislative history
for important insights into congressional intent. Without implying that this is no longer the case, we
note that interest groups who fail to persuade a majority of the Congress to accept particular statutory language often are able to have inserted in the legislative history of the statute statements
favorable to their position, in the hope that they can persuade a court to construe the statutory
language in light of these statements. This development underscores the importance of following
unambiguous statutory language absent clear contrary evidence of legislative intent.")
52. See supra text accompanying note 6.
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matic alteration in the nature and possibilities of legislative function.
While oversight may be enhanced, the members' participation in legislation is impoverished.
Debate and discussion have lost their central place in the legislative
process and that loss has produced serious consequences. The growing
importance of staff is but one reflection of the new situation... Most
of the information reaching members may well be reliable, but it would
take an expert to sort out the reliable from the unreliable, and even an
expert cannot possibly know about material that has been stifled to
The second problem
serve a staff's or chairman's own interest ....
with the use of staff . . is that it has not left the members with more
time to concentrate on their legislative work. . . . [W]hile representa-

tives as recently as 1965 spent almost one full day every week on 'legislative research and reading,' by 1977 the time spent on reading was
down to an average of eleven minutes per day. In other words, instead
of freeing the members to concentrate, the staffs contribute to the frenetic pace of congressional life that pulls members in different directions, reduces the time available53 for joint deliberation, and makes
concentration all but impossible.

Again, successful legislation continues to be the product of a political
history-all this lobbying and staff activity is valued for its contributions
to effective shaping as well as for its possible impact on the resolution of
subsequent disputes about meaning-yet, also again, telling the two apart
is problematic.
A.

The Problem of "DemocraticExegesis"

Surely, care and discretion are warranted; and in some circumstances, the difficulties and risks in using legislative history materials support refusing the undertaking. Omnibus budget reconciliation measures,
for example, whose several hundred pages may not even be printed
before midnight legislative "debate" and passage, are self-evident minefields whose political history may reflect little more than the tactics of
exploitation and exasperation. 54 Some Justices, most notably Justice
Scalia, are advancing arguments that such history ought never be relied
53. M. MALKIN, UNELECTED REPRESENTATION 240, 242-44 (1979).
54. Gordon Crovitz told a Symposium in WASH. U.L.Q. of the account given by Rep. Chris
Cox, a freshman member of the 101st Congress, of the budget reconciliation bill enacted in the
closing moments of that Congress:
[Niot a single member of the House or Senate was permitted to even read the budget reconciliation bill before the vote on passage. It was not even hauled to the chamber until moments before the vote was conducted in the wee hours .... Its thousands of pages, which
the clerk hadn't even had time to number, had to be tied together with rope like newspapers bundled for recycling. Reading it was out of the question, it's true I was permitted to
walk around the box, and to gaze upon it from several angles and even to touch it.
68 WASH. U.L.Q. 614; Compare Sorenson v. Secretary of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 866 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:321

upon. Thus, when an opinion puts reliance on the approving reference
made, in passing, to three district court decisions as part of a single legislative committee's extensive report on proposed legislation, Justice Scalia
observed acidly:
that only a small proportion of the members of Congress read either
one of the Committee Reports in question, even if (as is not always the
case) the Reports happen to have been published before the vote; that
very few of those who did read them set off for the nearest law library
to check out what was actually said in the ... cases at issue (or in the
more than 50 other cases cited by the House and Senate Reports); and
that no member of Congress came to the judgment that the District
Court cases would trump [an earlier Supreme Court precedent having
some bearing] on the point at issue because the latter was dictum. As
anyone familiar with modem-day drafting of congressional committee
reports is well aware, the references to the cases were inserted, at best
by a committee staff member on his or her own initiative, and at worst
by a committee staff member at the suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist;
and the purpose of those references was not primarily to inform the
members of Congress what the bill meant (for [then the passage would
have been written differently]), but rather to influence judicial
construction. 55
Perhaps the most striking of the recent Supreme Court discussions
came in the concurrence of Justice Kennedy and two others during the
1988 Term, in Public Citizen v. Department of Justice.56 The case asked
whether the ABA's Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary was an
advisory committee under the Federal Advisory Committee Act. The
majority answered that question in the negative by reading the statute
with the help of its legislative history. A fair-minded reader who considered that history and thought about Congress' probable purposes in enacting the statute could readily have come to that result, but one who
only looked at and thought about the text of the statute would be very
sure that the Standing Committee indeed was an Advisory Committee
under the Act, and so had to hold its meetings in public after notice,
deliver its advice openly, and in other ways frustrate what we can expect
to have been the President's aims in consulting with it. Justice Kennedy
took the latter course, strongly suggesting that separation of powers considerations required him to do so:
Where the language of a statute is clear in its application, the normal
55. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). I do not mean to
suggest that I accept this line of argument. See Farber & Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public
Choice, 79 VA. L. REV. 423, 438-50 (1988); and Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV.
621, 650-56 (1990). See also infra text accompanying note 64.
56. 491 U.S. 440 (1989). The Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor joined Justice Kennedy. One
might as well count this as the opinion of all four Reagan Justices, as Justice Scalia was not participating yet in many ways has signaled his probable agreement with the views expressed.
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rule is that we are bound by it. There is, of course, a legitimate exception to this rule . . . [in] situations where the result of applying the
plain language would be, in a genuine sense, absurd, i.e., where it is
quite impossible that Congress could have intended the result and
where the alleged absurdity is so clear as to be obvious to most anyone
I believe the Court's loose invocation of the "absurd result"
canon of statutory construction creates too great a risk that the Court
is exercising its own "WILL instead of JUDGMENT," with the consequence of "substituti[ng its own] pleasure to that of the legislative

body." 5 7

. . .

Where it is clear that the unambiguous language of a

statute embraces certain conduct, and it would not be patently absurd
to apply the statute to such conduct, it does not foster a democratic
exegesis for this Court to rummage through unauthoritative materials
to consult the spirit of the legislation in order to discover an alternative
interpretation58 of the statute with which the Court is more
comfortable.
Even if we were concerned with judges alone, these problems need
not persuade us to retreat from the use of these materials; that use arose,
history teaches us, among judges reacting to a prior generat ion's stubbornness in the face of legislative change that was itself hard to square
with "a democratic exegesis." 59 The problem, of course, is how the
reader, in particular the judicial reader, reliably knows that language is
"unambiguous." As Kenneth C. Davis long ago remarked:
Throughout the English-speaking world during the present century,
dissatisfaction has often been expressed about inadequate understanding by judges of social purposes behind major enactments ....
Does
extensive use of legislative history force the judges to keep in closer
touch with democratic desires? Is legislative intent usually so elusive
that what the judges find often depends to some extent upon their own
social philosophies and if so, are those social philosophies likely to be
in better tune with the attitudes of parliamentary majorities if 6 the
judges are more familiar with legislative programs and processes? 0
One sees here alternative visions of the problem-for Justice Kennedy,
the headstrong judge who would manipulate the scraps of history for
advantage, but may be constrained by language; for Professor Davis, the
headstrong judge who cannot see past the language unless acquainted
with and constrained by its context. The central word for Kennedy is
"rummage"; Davis forcefully reminds of us of times within memory
when judges repeatedly defeated "democratic exegesis" precisely by their
refusal to acknowledge the purposes and understandings that unauthori57. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); compare supra text
accompanying note 25.
58. Public Citizen, 109 S. Ct. at 2574-76.
59. See, e.g., de Sloovere, ExtrinsicAids in the Interpretationof Statutes, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 527,
539 (1940); Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation,"43 HARV. L. REV. 886, 889-91 (1930).

60. Davis, Legislative History and the Wheat Board Case, 31 CAN. B. REV. 1, 12 (1953).
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tative materials conveyed. The lesson of history is that for judges to restrict themselves to language risks displacing, not defending, a
6
"democratic exegesis."1 '
B.

The Problem in Agency Context

But the concern here is with agency practice, and in that context it
is important to note that the focus on the judiciary and its role in relation
to legislative history oversimplifies the legislative history debate in at
least two ways. First, because we begin with a model of the judicial role
in which political oversight of particular decisions has no proper place
whatever, we have difficulty imagining that using or excluding legislative
history will have systemic consequences for the ways in which the judiciary interacts with the President and Congress. We have no need to consider, for the courts, the difficult calculus required for agencies that do
undergo current political oversight as well as the constraints of law.
With respect to agencies, we saw, changing the traditions of statute-reading to exclude the use of legislative history might well enhance the relative importance and efficacy of contemporary political oversight-an
62
impact with its own arguable "separation of powers" consequences.
The second oversimplification inheres in the contrast between discrete and relational analysis in the episodic and inevitably retrospective
character of judicial encounters with issues of statutory meaning. Responsible in some sense for all law, a court has infrequent occasion to
consider the meaning of any particular part of the law, and no responsibility for continuing, proactive attention to its development. 63 If it comes
to the legislative history at all, it comes to that history cold, without a
developed institutional sense of the state of play. It does not participate
in, indeed very likely is utterly unaware of, what occurs in drafting, hearings, debates, or a continuing course of oversight hearings, presidential
guidance, and frustrated efforts at securing legislative change; a court is
not continually studying issues of statutory meaning and adjusting outcomes-as administrators responsible for a program must. For the
agency, of course, the reverse is generally true; its closeness to the legislative process, continued involvement, and responsibility are, as we have
seen, precisely the reasons courts have long given its readings of statutory
61. Note in this respect the confidence of Justice Scalia, the most strident current proponent of
return to text-based interpretation, that he will usually know what a statute "means." Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 521.
62. See supra text accompanying note 44.
63. See Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Casesper Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's
Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1987); Diver,
supra note I at 574-78 nn.163-82.
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meaning special weight. Delegitimating reference to legislative history
for the agency, then, not only reduces its defenses to contemporary political oversight; it encourages it to ignore, in acting, what in an important
sense it already knows.
The arguments about the use of legislative history are transformed
when we come to see them in the context of continuing and rich relationships between an agency and its political overseers, in which issues of
statutory meaning are constantly on center stage. The enduring and
multifaceted character of the agency's relationship with Congress contributes to the agency's capacity to distinguish reliably those considerations that served to shape the legislation, the legislative history wheat,
from the more manipulative chaff. An agency's participation in the debates, for example, may well permit it to say, as a court never could,
whether the reference to three district court opinions in a report fairly
reflects the resolution of argument about what will be in the language of
a bill, or an adventitious midnight insertion. 64 While it is formally correct to state that Congress enacts language, not legislative history, the
committee system in Congress gives major (but not exclusive) responsibility for oversight to the same group of politicians as has the principal
function of shaping statutory language in the legislative process. Having
such a system gives rise to commitments well understood on both sidesin the agency and in the Congress as a whole-to the importance of what
is worked out in committee context. Moreover, that history, however
troubled, is connected with what for Congress is both the unusual and
the desirable outcome-the passage of legislation. Permitting the agency
to anchor its conduct there becomes in effect a statement to Congress
(which may well prefer the easier and more immediately rewarding paths
of oversight) about its need to legislate to achieve its ends should contemporary political forces take another turn. The continuing interactions
thus suggest structural reasons for supporting the agency practice of attending to the history.
Consider the possible analogy to the worlds of discrete and relational contracts. 65 The classic view of contracts as discrete, consent-centered transactions leads swiftly to the parole evidence rule-that courts
will interpret a written agreement on the basis of its words, without reference to external context. Accommodating the existence of contracts having a relational character put unsustainable pressure on the parole
evidence rule. What was initially a straight-forward proposition emerged
64. See supra note 55.
65. See supra text accompanying note 21.
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in the Second Restatement of Contracts as requiring "eight sections and
twenty-seven pages of commentary to create a complex set of rules that
seem to have the effect of letting in almost everything, often in direct
contradiction of express written terms;"' 66 the effect is "to allow in evidence of business context, relationship, oral assurances and implicit understandings,1 67 leading the author from whom the foregoing quotations
have been taken to characterize the operative rule as "Tell the jury that
people don't usually write words into contracts for no reason, but that it
is free to read the document in light of common sense and all the outside
evidence."' 68 Seeing contracts as relational simply won't permit treating
their meaning as fully encompassed by the outward words initially used
to express them. Context-both at the time of drafting and as revealed
in subsequent life under the contract-are essential both to accommodate
the legal order to the realities of the setting in which contracting is going
on, and to understand how the parties reasonably viewed the parameters
of their relationship.
The analogy to the problem of legislative history in the agency context ought to be obvious. Perhaps, given a statute that purports directly
to resolve the issues with which it deals, a court can afford to read it
using parole evidence rules, on the basis only of its outward-appearing
language. 69 Denying force to the political history of intransitive legislation is inconsistent with the reality of the setting within which legislation
occurs, and with the way in which agency and legislature reasonably
view the parameters of their relationship.
One possible problem with the analogy lies in its focus on the
agency-legislature context. Disputes before the courts are not disputes
between agency and legislature, but disputes between an agency and
members of the public whose interests its actions affect. These members
of the public may be interested in having the courts resolve questions of
meaning just on the basis of the language Congress has employed. This
possible interest has at least two aspects worth examination. Outsiders to
the relational process might fear that reliance upon it will lessen effective
controls on agency action by permitting the assertion of authority based
upon secret considerations. And they might believe that text-based interpretation will enhance judicial controls over administrative action by
66. Linzer, supra note 21, at 167.

67. Id. at 168.
68. Id. at 168 n.150.
69. The "perhaps" is important. On the whole, the public might be thought far less concerned
about the success or not of private parties in creating the "law" that will govern their litigative
disputes than about securing readings of statutes that are informed by their political history.
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sharply reducing if not eliminating the judicial inclination to defer to
agency judgment.
Thus, it may be protested, arguments for permitting agency reliance
on political history that rely on agency participation in politics serve to
elevate the arcane of the legislative process--celebrate precisely those elements of the process that are least likely to be captured in print, even the
print of committee reports, debates or hearings. Judicial interpretation,
even at the height of reliance on legislative history, has restricted itself to
the public record in recognition of the publicity values of a democratic
society. 70 In valuing the agency's participatory sense of the enterprise,
we risk losing sight of the private citizen whose interests may be affected
by the agency's reading of the statutes; to the citizen these elements are,
if anything, even less accessible than they are to the courts. Rather than
enhancing the influence of law as against politics, the argument would
run, building an argument on the agency's expert knowledge of legislative history reduces the citizen's protections against willful government;
she will simply be unable to mount persuasive contrary arguments.
This line of argument found classic expression in the opinions of
Justice Jackson, a man whose lawyering experience in government and
out had persuaded him that the imbalance was fatal:
The practice of the Federal Government relying on inaccessible law
has heretofore been condemned .... Today's decision [relying on

legislative history materials that Justice Jackson represented to have
been inaccessible to the public 71] marks a regression from this modern
tendency. It pulls federal law... into a fog in which little can be seen
if found. Legislative history here as 72
usual is more vague than the statute we are called upon to interpret.
Note, however, that Justice Jackson's argument focuses on the occasional contacts between agencies and courts, and not on the workings of
70. Diver, supra note 1, at 557 n.51.
71. In the particular case, the charge of inaccessibility appears to have been misplaced. Finley,
Crystal Gazing: The Problem of Legislative History, 45 A.B.A. J. 1281 (1959). The text argument,
however, depends on propositions about special knowledge that frustrate so easy a refutation. While
some private lawyers-for example, those hired as lobbyists during the debates--may have knowledge of the political history of legislation approximating the agency's, the general public will not.
That is the whole point about expertise. Nor can one properly respond about this kind of knowledge, as H. Hart and A. Sacks did about the publishable materials of legislative history, that "[a]s
soon as the Supreme Court has definitively answered its question about the utility of legislative
materials in the interpretation of federal statutes,.., private ordering [can] be counted upon to solve
its problem of making the materials available[.]" H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 127983 (10th ed. 1958). For an argument that such difficulties are simply part of the apparatus of the
administrative state, with which we must learn to live in uneasy tension, see Rabin, The Administrative State and Its Excesses: Reflections on The New Property,24 U.S.F. L. REV. 273, 282-89 (1990).
72. United States v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295, 319 (1953) (Jackson, J. concurring). Chief Justice Rehnquist was Justice Jackson's law clerk at the time of this decision.
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agency process overall, or the agency's interactions with all the external
forces that may impinge on it. The citizen's disadvantage in individual
litigation-that is to say, the agency's claim to judicial respect for its
legislative history expertise-had long been assured by such rules as the
command to give "great weight" to the "contemporaneous construction
of a statute by the men charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly
while they are yet untried and new [or to interpretations made by those
who] suggested the provision's enactment to Congress."' 73 These approaches reflect assessments of the systemic advantagesfor law of valuing
that expertise.
One such advantage, already suggested, lies in using the agency's
knowledge of legislative history as an anchor against the tugs of current
politics. Recall the possible consequences for judicial process of approaches that do or do not value the agency's uses of legislative historyJustice Kennedy's concern about rummaging, and Professor Davis'
about headstrong judges. 74 When we turn to the agency and its use of
legislative history to constrain current politics, the change in context
sharply diminishes the force of the Kennedy argument, and heightens
that of Davis. Courts and private lawyers may not be subject to discipline in their "rummaging," but agencies are. When the agency resists
political direction, it does so in the context of its continuing relationships
with actors-the White House, Congress and its committees-who know
the "unauthoritative" materials well, and are in some position to assist a
"democratic exegesis." To be successful in resisting current political
force, the agency will have to be credible; indeed, its credibility in vulnerable and continuing relationships will likely have an importance to it
quite transcending any advantage to be gained from momentary manipulation of the record.
Two related difficulties might be acknowledged here. The discussion is cast in terms of agency resistance to current political force; where
the agency disposition is to follow that force, that could be characterized
as problematic in "democratic exegesis" terms if the force being followed
were properly characterizable in "public choice" terms of private dealing
and self-interest. 75 Further, the possibility of an extended, institutionalized skew between Republican President and Democrat Congress may
73. United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 549 (1940) (quoting Norwegian
Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933)); see also SEC v. Collier, 76 F.2d
939 (2d Cir. 1935) (L. Hand, J.)
74. See supra text accompanying note 58.
75. See Diver, supra note 1, at 558 nn.63-7
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diminish the disciplinary force of the relationship with Congress; as long
as the President can be pleased, his veto power may protect the agency
against effective reprisal. These are difficulties-the latter chosen with
some regularity (if little conscious comprehension) by the people, it may
be noted-but it is hard to see how agency textualism would ease them.
Releasing the anchor of past political force gives current winds the
greater impact; it denies the general relational characteristic of the
agency's existence and functioning; and thus it also denies the bases for
claiming deference to agency judgment. Would it have been harder for
Ann Gorsuch to change EPA as she did, if neither the bureaucrats whose
direction she sought to change nor courts reviewing the results could
appropriately refer to the political history of what had gone before? Judicial insistence on agency explanation of statutory reasoning in terms of
past experience and, in particular, judicial attention to unexplained departures from prior readings-conventional elements of abuse-of-discretion review-might do more to meet these difficulties and complement
political oversight than returning to idiosyncratic readings on an impov76
erished informational base.
VI.

CONCLUSION: THE CHEVRON PROBLEM

The foregoing line of argument presupposes that agency statutereading will be respected by subsequent-particularly judicial-readers.
That is, it presupposes an approach like that of Chevron USA v. NRDC 7 7
that requires (or at least counsels) courts to accept reasonable, even if
disputable, readings that agencies have given their statutes. In the absence of such an approach, the need of the subsequent, authoritative statute-reader for manageable interpretive conventions would dominate the
agencies' interests. If courts would remain at sea about what meanings
are sound to ascribe to past political histories, or would not be subject to
effective discipline-would tend to "rummage"-in selecting among the
possibilities opened up by those histories, a system that stresses judicial
readings might appropriately discard those histories. Perilous as ac76. The effect of "hard look" review, wrote an unusually perceptive bureaucrat, is to "give
those who care about well-documented and well-reasoned decisionmaking a lever with which to
move those who do not." Pedersen, FormalRecords and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 60
(1975). That result is not inevitably desirable; agency defensiveness in anticipation of intensive review is credited in well-regarded analyses with slowing rulemaking at three important safety agencies
to a crawl. R. MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT
(1983); J. MASHAW & D. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990); J. MENDELOFF, THE
DILEMMA OF Toxic SUBSTANCE REGULATION (1988). It seems unlikely, however, that the burden

of explaining statutory readings would often match that of rationalizing the choice of one rather
than another standard for exposure to, say, airborne lead.
77. 467 U. S. 837 (1984); see also supra note 17.
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cepting simple judicial text-readings of complex relational arrangements
might be, it would not arm additional current political controls over the
agencies' work; agency attorneys would then work within the constraints
of "what we could reasonably expect to convince a court our statute
means," a frame of reference that is not overtly political.
But the Chevron approach is, in fact, much more closely aligned
with current patterns of legislation, creating ongoing relationships rather
than point-in-time resolutions; it is not realistic to expect those patterns
to change. Moreover, Chevron-type rules express now-inevitable characteristics of the agency/court relationship: that opportunities for statutereading in the agency dominate those that arise in court; that agencies
read their particular statutes with a far richer understanding of context,
interrelationship, and impact than courts could hope to achieve; and that
agencies have the superior potential for securing national uniformity in
the interpretation and application of complex statutes. 78 Indeed, to some
degree we want an element of current politics in statutory interpretation,
79
and agencies provide a means for securing that.
If we are going to have Chevron-type rules, so that current politics
plays an acknowledged role in the ascription of meaning, then it is madness also to adopt rules for statute-reading that foreclose attention to past
politics-that is, to legislative history and the subsequent course of the
agency/legislative relationship. The harm to be expected is precisely the
freeing up of current politics-legislative, executive, and judicial-in relation to law, as the agencies thus made responsible for the articulation of
meaning experience the inevitable tensions between them. It is not only
that our hypothetical agency lawyer will have fewer weapons with which
to resist today's expediency; as important, the traditions within which
she performs her own function will have changed-she will have been
persuaded of the foolishness or inappropriateness of making the inquiries
that might even to lead her to question whether she ought to resist.
Perhaps what we describe as law is all shadow and fetish; perhaps,
as Learned Hand once darkly remarked (in another context), "in the end
this may seem merely a fiat, but that is always true, whatever the dis78. Strauss, supra note 63.
79. Judges are not experts in the field, and not part of either political branch of the Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on
the basis of the judges' personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibility may, within the limits of that delegation,
properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its
judgments.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
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guise."' 80 Yet one's conviction is that the disguises, the traditions, also
serve to structure and constrain-that the ceremonies of a rule of law
culture make the performance of a body that observes them different, less
dangerous and more acceptable, than would otherwise obtain.

80. Sinram v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 61 F.2d 767, 771 (2d. Cir. 1932).

